






· How can terrorist financing be 
interfered with? 
 
· Is counter-terrorist financing 
achieving its stated aims? 
 
· Is counter-terrorist financing 
effective and efficient? 
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Counter-Terrorist 
Financing – A Good 
Policy Going Too Far? 
Summary:  ‘The  money  trail’  of  terrorist  activity 
has  become  a  focus  of  counterterrorist  policy. 
There  has  been  major  success  in  implementing 
international  standards  to  prevent  and  detect 
terrorist  financing.  Available  evidence  suggests 
that these efforts have contributed to a decrease in 
transnational  terrorist  activity.  In  the  wake,  they 
are  likely  to  have  contributed  to  a  shift  from 
transnational  to  “home  grown”  terrorism.  Partly 
because of this change, and partly because of the 
continuous  expansion  of  counter-terrorist-














Efforts to deprive terrorist groups of the financial 
means  to  operate  have  been  one  of  the  major 
approaches  to  counter  terrorism.  Expectations  of 
the  contribution  counter-terrorist  financing  can 
make  sometimes  run  high.  For  instance,  the  US 
government stated in its 2003 National Strategy to 
combat  terrorism:  “with  the  cooperation  of  our 
partners  and  appropriate  international 
organizations, we will continue our aggressive plan 
to  eliminate  the  sources  of  terrorist  financing” 
(United States 2003). In a speech on September 8, 
2011, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said: 
“combating  terrorist  financing  continues  to  be  a 
central  part  of  our  nation's,  and  other  nations', 
counter-terrorism strategies.” 1. 
Fostered by determined political support emanating 
from  the  United  States,  a  quite  elaborate  and 
comprehensive global system of counter-terrorism 
financing  has  been  set  up.  It  is  implemented  by 
governments,  but  international  organizations such 
as the United Nations (UN) and the Financial Action 
Task  Force  (FATF)  play  an  important  role,  as  do 
private  actors,  such  as  banks.  The  system  has 
considerable costs, for the financial sector as well as 
its  customers.  Furthermore,  it  has  serious 
1 http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/ 
2011/09/20110908125802su0.8468068.html#axzz1Ysnq
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Counter-terrorism financing need to better target 
those types of behavior and activity it can influence 
implications  for  relationships  between  financial 
actors  and  their  customers,  as  well  as  the 
fundamental  rights  of  individuals  affected  by  the 
system.  
It is argued here that counter-terrorist financing has 
had notable success in suppressing terrorism. There 
is  evidence  that  it  has  made  it  more  difficult  for 
transnational  terrorist  groups  to  operate  and  has 
contributed to the reduction of their importance.  
However, counter-terrorist financing can only target 
certain  types  of  terrorist  behavior  and  activity. 
Furthermore,  terrorist 
groups  have  adapted  to 
counter-terrorism 
financing.  As  a  result, 
counter-terrorism 
financing  has  contributed  to  a  shift  away  from 
transnational  terrorism  to  ‘home-grown’  or 
domestic terrorism. In consequence, the importance 
of  counter-terrorist  financing  in  suppressing 
terrorist activity has decreased with its success. 
At the same time, counter-terrorism financing has 
grown  in  scope  and  costs.  One  reason  for  the 
continuing expansion of counter-terrorist financing 
activity is the difficulty to assess the effectiveness of 
these  activities.  While  assessments  of  counter-
terrorism financing are frequent, they focus on the 
implementation of an expanding range of measures 
but  not  on  evidence  that  these  measures  are 
effective in reducing terrorism. 
Counter-terrorist  financing  should  remain  an 
element  of  the  fight  against  terrorism.  But  its 
limitations  need  to  be  better  understood. 
Furthermore, it should become better targeted 
on  those  types  of  behavior  and  activity  it  can 
influence. Better targeting will also reduce costs.  
The  instruments  of  counter-terrorist 
financing 
Counter-terrorist financing rests on two pillars. 
One  is  the  freezing  of  assets  of  groups  and 
individuals  judged  to  be  involved  in  or 
supporting  terrorism  by  relevant  political 
authorities such as the UN, the European Union (EU) 
or  individual  governments.  Asset  freezes  are 
particularly effective when newly introduced. Once 
organizations and individuals are on terrorist lists, 
they avoid holding assets that can easily be frozen. 
In addition to some organizations, such as Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban, a few thousand individuals are on 
the  various  terrorist  lists.  Some  of  the  most 
controversial freezes were those that   hit charities 
judged  by  the  relevant  authorities  to  have 
transferred funds to terrorist organizations.  
The amounts of terrorist assets frozen are not very 
large compared to the estimates of financial means 
available  to  terrorist  organizations.  Schneider  and 
Caruso have estimated the total annual budget of all 
Islamist  groups  involved  in  terrorism  at  100-150 
million  US  $  in  the  early  2000s  (Schneider  and 
Caruso 2011). While substantial amounts of assets 
were frozen in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks,  the  amounts  have  not  grown  much 
thereafter.  Recent  global  data  is  not  available  but 
the data for the United States in table 1 is a good 
indicator of overall trends. 
The  second  pillar  of  counter-terrorist  financing 
addresses financial transactions. Since 2001, banks 
and  an  increasing  number  of  other  private  actors 
involved  in  financial  transactions  have  been 
Organisation  2003  2007  2010 
AL-QAEDA  3.9  11.3  13.5 
HAMAS  5.9  8.7  2.6 
HEZBOLLAH /(since 2006)  -  0.4  0.8 
Other  0.1  0.2  0.7 
Table 1 Counter-terrorist financing asset freezes by the United States 
Treasury in Millions of USD (Source: United States, U.S. Department of 
the Treasury. Office of Foreign Asset Control, Terrorist Assets Report, 
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The balance between transnational and ‘home-
grown’ terrorism has shifted, globally and in Europe 
required  to  report  suspicious  financial  activities 
related to terrorism. This occurs within the system 
set up to counter money laundering. While there is 
considerable  overlap  between  these  two  issues, 
there are also important differences between efforts 
to  counter  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing. In particular, counter-terrorist financing 
has  the  double  purpose  to  prevent  financial 
transactions of terrorists as well as to get evidence 
on  links  between  terrorist  groups  and  individuals 
by “following the money trail”. Despite the adoption 
of  common  international  standards,  country 
practices of reporting on suspicious activities differ 
widely. Among members of the European Union for 
instance,  the  number  of  reports  in  2008  ranged 
between  62  for  Hungary  and  295,464  for  the 
Netherlands (Eurostat 2010). 
Success and limitations  
The  number  of  reports  concerning  suspicious 
transactions or activities by financial 
actors is quite large (see table 2). The 
number  of  known  cases  where 
reports  were  important  in 
preventing  terrorist  attacks  or  in 
detecting  terrorist  networks, 
however,  is  comparatively  small 
(Brzoska,  2009,  2011).  The  UN 
expert group charged with reviewing 
the  implementation  of  financial 
sanctions against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban reported 
in  April  2011  that  it  knew  of  virtually  “no  cases 
where  suspicious  transaction  reports  have  led  to 
prosecutions or even investigations of Al-Qaida or 
Taliban related criminality”. (United Nations 2011). 
However,  it  would  be  premature  to  measure  the 
effectiveness of reports on suspicious transactions 
on such criteria only. In addition to prevention and 
detection,  their  deterrent  effect  needs  to  be 
considered.  There  is  some  evidence  that  financial 
transactions,  particularly  from  outside  sources, 
have  become  less  important  in  funding  terrorist 
networks  and  activities  since  2001.  Particularly 
striking  is  the  decline  of  Al-Qaeda,  both  as  an 
organization conducting terrorist attacks itself and 
supporting  other  groups  with  financial  means 
(Gunaratna 2008). 
Another indicator of the success of counter-terrorist 
financing is the general shift in terrorist activity that 
has  occurred  in  the  last  few  years.  The  available 
data  suggests  that  the  balance  between 
transnational  and  ‘home-grown’  terrorism  has 
shifted, globally and in Europe (Enders, Sandler and 
Gaibulloev  2011).  While  other  factors,  such  as 
improved  international  cooperation  in 
counterterrorism, have contributed to this shift, it 
could  also  be  attributed  to  improved  counter-
terrorist financing (Brzoska 2009). 
Costs of counter-terrorist financing 
Counter-terrorist financing has direct, indirect and 
intangible  costs.  Direct  costs  accrue  to  banks, 
insurances  and  other financial  actors, for instance 
through  the  requirement  to  operate  systems 
capable  of  detecting 
suspicious  transactions. 
Indirect  costs  include  the 
additional  costs  for 
customers  of  traditional  money  transfer  systems, 
such  as  the  Hawala  network,  through  new 
requirements on data reporting and accountability. 
Intangible costs have attracted the most attention. 
In the wake of growing requirements of detecting 
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2002  2003  2005  2007  2009 
Total 




90  127  104  90  98 
Share   4%  2%  1.3%  0.9%  1.1% 
 
Table 2 Suspicious transaction reports filed with German authorities for selected 
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Current assessment methods add to the 
tendency of expanding the scope and 
intensity of counter-terrorism financing 
suspicious  transactions,  bank  and  other  financial 
actors have been required to report an increasing 
amount  of  data  to  relevant  authorities,  often 
without their customers’ knowledge. The degree of 
privacy in financial matters has been reduced.  
It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  costs  of  counter-
terrorist  financing.  One  important  reason  is  that 
counter-terrorist  financing  and  efforts  to  reduce 
money  laundering  largely  overlap.  Thus  it  is 
impossible  to  disentangle  the  costs  of  counter-
terrorist  financing  and  efforts  against  money 
laundering. Even rough estimates are fraught with 
difficulties.  While  counter-terrorist  financing  is 
much  less  significant  than  money  laundering  in 
terms  of  quantities,  for  instance  suspicious 
transaction  reports  (see  table  3),  it  has  been  a 
driver  for  the 
tightening  of  control 
over  financial 
transactions.  The 
international  system 
of  financial  controls 
started out with an emphasis on money laundering, 
but it received a major push after the September 11, 
2001 attacks in the United States. It is unlikely that 
efforts  against  money  laundering  would  have 
developed as much as they have done without the 
strong  political  support  for  counter-terrorist 
financing.  
But even if lumped together, the costs of counter-
terrorist financing and money laundering are hard 
to assess. Estimates of the costs for financial agents, 
such  as  banks,  differ  widely,  from  minor  to 
substantial (Brzoska 2011, Bures 2010). 
Assessments of effectiveness under uncertainty 
Counter-terrorist financing has been very successful 
as  a  policy  instrument.  The  Financial  Action  Task 
Force  (FATF)  recommendations  have  become  an 
international standard. The degree of adherence to 
the rules set by the FATF by national authorities is 
very  high  compared  to  other  international 
agreements.  Adherence to the recommendations is 
based  on  strong  policy  measures.  Particularly 
important  are  assessments  of  implementations, 
such  as  the  peer-reviews  conducted  under  the 
auspices  of 
international 
organizations  such 
as the FATF. 
These  assessments 
provide  a  lot  of  information  on  legal  and 
institutional  arrangements  in  the  field  of  counter-
terrorist financing as well as the implementation of 
the relevant FAFT regulations. However, they rarely 
contain information on the effectiveness of counter-
terrorism financing in terms of reducing terrorism, 
nor  are  they  concerned  with  the  various  costs  of 
counter-terrorism financing. Furthermore, through 
their focus on detecting and 
exposing  gaps  in 
implementation, they add to 
the tendency, inherent in the 
current system, of expanding 
the  scope  and  intensity  of 
counter-terrorist  financing 
(Brzoska 2011).  
Most  available  assessment 
are  poor  foundations  for 
evidence-based  policies,  as 
they  contain  neither 
measures  of  the  success  of 
Location  Year  Estimated costs to conduct attack 
New York, Washington  (9/11) 2001  € 300.000-370.000 
Casablanca  2003  € 4.000 
Madrid  (11/3) 2004  € 20.000 
London  (7/7) 2005  € 15.000 
Istanbul  2008  € 10.000 
Oslo  2011  €20.000 
Table 3 Estimated costs of terrorist attacks (sources: Own estimates and Krieger and 
Meirrieks 2011).   EUSECON POLICY BRIEFING 7 NOVEMBER 2011 | 5 
 
Counter-terrorism financing must be firmly 
rooted within ’normal’ police investigations 
counter-terrorist  financing  in  terms  of  reducing 
terrorism nor of the costs of these measures. This is 
partly  the  result  of  the  setup  of  international 
counter-terrorism financing, which starts from the 
presumption  of  the  overarching  importance  of 
controlling finances and financial transactions as an 
instrument  in  the  fight  against 
terrorism.  But  it  also  stems  from 
the difficulty of measuring success 
of  counter-terrorism  financing. 
Similar to other policies in high-risk areas, counter-
terrorism  financing  is  driven  by  historical 
precedents  and  worst-case  scenarios,  rather  than 
cost-benefit analysis. 
Policy recommendations 
Counter-terrorist financing continues to be a useful 
instrument in the fight against terrorism, though its 
scope is more limited now than ten years ago. One 
reason  for  this  is  that  transnational  terrorist 
networks,  particularly  Al-Qaeda,  have  been 
weakened  -  to  some  degree  by  counter-terrorist 
financing.  Another is that terrorists have adapted to 
the  new  realities.  A  substitution  effect  has  been 
stimulated,  from  externally  funded  to  locally 
organized terrorist  attacks. Evidence over the  last 
decade  indicates  that  counter-terrorist  financing 
can  be  important  in  detecting  networks  among 
terrorists, albeit most often after terrorist attacks. 
Its  importance  in  prevention  of  terrorist  attacks, 
however, seems to be limited. 
Such assessments are, unfortunately, not based on 
solid  evidence.  A  first  policy  recommendation 
therefore  pertains  to  the  need  for  broader 
assessments  than  those  currently  undertaken.  In 
addition  to  the  identification  of  gaps  in 
implementation,  it  is  necessary  to  assess  the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorist financing in terms 
of  reducing  terrorism,  including  consideration  of 
substitution effects. Costs estimates also should be 
part of such broader assessment.  
A  second  policy  recommendation  refers  to  the 
better  targeting  of  counter-terrorist  financing. 
Counter-terrorist  financing  currently  resembles  a 
shot-gun approach to policy. More targeted policies, 
aiming  at  a  smaller  number  of  relevant  actors 
instead  of  a  general  approach  based  on  weak 
criteria  of  ‘suspicion’  is  clearly  preferable.  Some 
steps  in  this  direction  have  already  been  taken. 
However, more needs to be done. 
This would also facilitate a third recommendation, 
namely  to  more  firmly  root  counter-terrorist 
financing  within  ‘normal’  routines  of  police 
investigations  and  the  general  legal  framework. 
Counter-terrorist  financing,  including  both  asset 
freezing  and  the  control  of  financial  transactions, 
are, in some parts, ‘extraordinary’ measures, outside 
of that framework. This pertains, for instance, to the 
freezing  of  assets  of  individuals  outside  of  legal 
proceedings against them. 
Summing up, the recommendation is to strengthen 
evidence-based  policy  in  the  field  of  counter-
terrorist  financing.  Counter-terrorist  financing  is 
needed, but with costs concomitant to its success in 
suppressing terrorism. 
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